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EGAN V. MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE CO.:
THE EXPANDING USE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN BREACH OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT ACTIONS
In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., the California
Court of Appeal authorized $2,500,000 in punitive damages for
an insurer's breach of contract. Such a large award of punitive
damages is unique in contract actions. This Comment ex-
amines punitive damages in general and their appropriateness
in insurance contract cases. The author first discusses the
evolution of the punitive damages doctrine in contract ac-
tions. He then critically evaluates the Egan decision, discus-
sing the advantages of, and objedtions to, punitive damages.
The author concludes that punitive damages are an effective
tool for discouraging breaches by insurers.
INTRODUCTION
In 1967 the California Supreme Court, in Crisci v. Security Insur-
ance Co.,' first characterized the breach of an insurance contract as a
tort. Since then, several other California decisions have held that
defendant insurance companies owe tort duties to their insureds.' As
a result, the range of remedies traditionally available in contract
actions has been expanded. Compensatory damages for emotional
suffering, as well as punitive damages, are now available for certain
breaches of insurance contracts. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Co.' represents another step in the expansion of the insured's rights
against his or her insurer. The California Court of Appeal allowed
$2,500,000 in punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages
for future loss. This Comment examines the significance of the Egan
decision and concludes that punitive damages are a legitimate tool
for protecting an insured from abuses by his or her insurer.
1. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
2. Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal.
3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9
Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
3. 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976).
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EGAN
The Purposes of Punitive Damages
There are two objectives in tort law. The first is to make the injured
party whole. The second is to admonish the tortfeasor. As a general
rule, the defendant pays one sum of money to the plaintiff. The law
intends that this sum will accomplish both goals. However, depend-
ing on the extent of the injury inflicted and the defendant's moral
culpability, the single sum often cannot do so. 4 Thus, the law has
developed several devices for adjusting the amount of damages in
order to accomplish simultaneously the goals of admonishment and
reparation. These include the award of attorney fees, statutory dou-
ble or treble damages, and, most commonly, punitive damages.
The purposes of punitive damages are deterrence, punishment,
compensation, bounty, and vindication. The most often cited purpose
is deterrence. 5 When a defendant's conduct has been particularly
reprehensible, such as when the defendant acted with malice or
reckless disregard of the consequences, 6 it is often desirable to dis-
courage repetition by imposing punitive damages. Increasing the
severity of the admonition not only punishes the defendant for his or
her misconduct, but also discourages the defendant and other poten-
tial wrongdoers from similar misconduct. Compensatory damages
alone often cannot achieve this goal of admonition because the plain-
tiff's actual damages are not necessarily proportionate to the degree
of the defendant's culpability.
7
To serve the deterrent goal of punitive damages, the defendant's
financial condition must be considered in determining the amount of
the award. However, no objective standards exist for determining
how large an award is appropriate in a given case. Thus, appellate
courts are reluctant to interfere with a jury's award unless it appears
that the award was influenced by passion and prejudice.8
In other cases punitive damages are used to further compensate the
plaintiff.9 Generally, each party bears its own legal expenses. How-
4. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAav. L. REV. 1173 (1931).
5. Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz. 576, 490 P.2d 832 (1971); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 908, Comment a (1939); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §
3.9, at 205 (1973); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed.
1970); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1183-84
(1931).
6. Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Ac-
tions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668, 670 (1975).
7. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1184
(1931).
8. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 85, at 296-98 (1935).
9. Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Ac-
tions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668, 670 (1975).
[VOL. 15: 287, 1978] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ever, when the defendant has acted outrageously, it is often desirable
to force him or her to bear the plaintiff's legal expenses as well. This
burden is often imposed through punitive damages.1 0 The plaintiff is
awarded attorney fees so that an injured party will not be dis-
couraged from seeking legal recourse because of the expenses in-
volved."
Bounty is another rationale for punitive damages. The theory is
that when an individual's injury is only minor, he or she will be
discouraged from seeking recourse. But if the injury results from
particularly outrageous conduct, it is desirable to encourage the
injured party to protest the act. The law, therefore, makes the poten-
tial recovery more attractive.' 2 Punitive damages may punish in-
stances of oppressive conduct which are both criminal and civil
wrongs but which are never prosecuted criminally. Such cases in-
clude slanders and assaults.
Another justification for punitive damages is revenge or vindica-
tion. Punitive damages can help salvage a victim's hurt pride. This
award may satisfy the plaintiff's vindictive spirit and discourage him
or her from seeking self-help. 13 Thus, when a court desires to achieve
any of these ends-deterrence, further compensation, bounty, or re-
venge-punitive damages are an effective tool.
Punitive Damages in Contract Actions
At early common law, juries had unfettered discretion to fix the
amount of money damages.14 The awards were not labeled "compen-
satory" or "punitive." Later, however, judges wanted the awards to
bear some relation to the injury suffered" and began controlling the
10. The New Orleans, Jackson & Great N. R.R. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242
(1859); The New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. v. Grodek, 127 Ohio St. 22, 186
N.E. 733 (1933).
11. However, only three jurisdictions have expressly recognized this function.
Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich.
229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873); Note, Exemplary
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 520-21 (1957).
12. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,179 N.E.2d 497,223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 11 (4th ed. 1971); Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (1931).
13. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517,520-
21 (1957).
14. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 138, at 562 (1935);
Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8
IND. L. REv. 668 (1975).
15. See Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 LAW Q. REv.
345 (1931), for an in depth discussion of this area.
award of damages.16 Judges made rulings on evidence, gave jury
instructions on the question of amount, and granted new trials when
excessive judgments were returned.
As a result of this judicial concern, guidelines developed for reg-
ulating damages. For example, a tort defendant is liable only for
damages "proximately caused" by his or her acts. Objective stan-
dards were also developed for measuring the injury suffered in con-
tract actions. Judges were thus able to limit the juries' discretion in
contract suits.' 7 This was achieved first by formulating norms for the
amount of recovery for specific types of contract actions'-for ex-
ample, nonpayment of a debt. In Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 the common
law adopted the rule of foreseeability.20 Hadley held that contract
damages are limited to those "in the contemplation of both parties at
the time they made the contract."'" The standard is what a rea-
sonable person would have foreseen in light of the facts known to the
defendant. The Hadley standard has been almost universally accept-
ed.22 Because punitive damages are not in the minds of contracting
parties when a contract is formed, they were traditionally denied in
contract actions.
However, new torts were recognized, and some were closely related
to breaches of contract-for example, products liability. In addition,
as the law imposed greater duties on contracting parties, the breach
of some of these duties was treated as a tort for which punitive
damages may be recoverable. 23 Although some courts still steadfastly
refuse to allow punitive damages for any contract action, regardless
of the circumstances,2 4 most courts have moved away from a rigid
application of Hadley and now allow punitive damages under certain
conditions.
25
16. Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Ac.
tions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668 (1975).
17. Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1774); Note, Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 531 (1957); Note, The Expanding
Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8"IND. L. REV. 668 (1975).
18. For nonpayment of a debt, damages were limited to the amount of the
debt plus interest, and then only if evidenced by a receipt. For breach of con-
tract to sell land, damages were limited to the buyer's bare expenses. C. McCoR-
MIICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 138, at 562 (1935).
19. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (K.B. 1854).
20. J. CALAMARi, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 206, at 330 (1970).
21. 156 Eng.'Rep. at 151.
22. C. McCoRbIucx, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 138, at 566 (1935).
23. W. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED ToPIcs
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 402-20 (1953).
24. Young v. Main, 72 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1934); Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky
River Coal Corp.,. 69 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1934). Four states-Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Washington, and Connecticut-refuse to grant punitive damages
unless authorized by statute. Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
25. E.g., Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Economopoulus v.
Curls, 377 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. App. 1964).
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The first step in the erosion of the Hadley rule occurred even
before that rule was firmly established. By the time several juris-
dictions had accepted the rule, an exception for contracts to marry
had already developed,26 and punitive damages were sometimes
awarded for breaches of these contracts.
The law has since recognized more and more situations in which
punitive damages are appropriate. 27 In limited situations the law
allowed punitive damages for injuries to passengers caused by a
common carrier.28 When the carrier is extremely negligent, its con-
duct is regarded as a tortious breach of its contract with the passen-
ger and punitive damages are available. Punitive damages have also
been awarded for the mishandling of a telegram which indicated-on
its face that it was important and should be handled carefully.
29
There have also been awards of punitive damages for the breach of
employment 0 and public utility3' contracts.
In addition, several decisions have held that a bank is liable in tort
for failure to honor a depositor's check when there are sufficient
funds on account. 2 Absent malice, the depositor's recovery is limited
26. Smith v. Hawkins, 120 Kan. 518, 243 P. 1018 (1926) (defendant is activated
by bad motives); Drobnick v. Bach, 159 Minn. 258, 198 N.W. 669 (1924) (willful
intent to break promise); Johnson v. Travis, 33 Minn. 231, 22 N.W. 624 (1885)
(improper motives); Baumle v. Verde, 33 Okla. 243, 124 P. 1083 (1912) (only if
defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice); Kaufman v. Fye, 99 Tenn.
145, 42 S.W. 25 (1897) (except where the defendant is more than 60 years old at
trial); Klitzke v. Davis, 172 Wis. 425, 179 N.W. 586 (1920) (wanton, ruthless con-
duct). It has been suggested that this exception exists because the breach of a
contract to marry has many characteristics of a tort. Note, Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 531 (1957).
Some states, however, do not allow punitive damages for breach of a contract
to marry. Trammell v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S.W. 79 (1900); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 89, § 27 (Smith-Hurd 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1952).
27. For a detailed discussion of the overlap of tort and contract law, see W.
PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 380 (1953).
28. Burrus v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., 38 Nev. 196, 145 P. 926 (1915).
29. Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 138 S.C. 281, 136 S.E. 218 (1927) (tele-
gram informing relative of a funeral).
30. Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956.(8th Cir. 1944).
31. Birmingham Waterworks v. Keiley, 2 Ala. App. 629, 56 So. 838 (1911)
(wrongfully terminating service); Southwestern Gas and Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45
S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (defendant acting intentionally or with gross
negligence or malice).
32. Woody v. National Bank of Rocky Mount, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927);
Rolin v. Steward, 139 Eng. Rep. 245 (K.B. 1854); Marzetti v. Williams, 109 Eng.
Rep. 842 (K.B. 1830). The general debtor-creditor rule is that a debtor is not liable
in tort to his creditor for failure to pay the debt. The debtor's liability is based on
to damages reasonably and actually occurring. However, if malice is
present, the depositor may recover punitive damages.
33
Brokers have also been held liable for punitive damages in certain
situations.34 A broker is ordinarily liable only for the loss actually
caused to the principal or for any unjust enrichment the broker
received by his or her actions. However, when a real estate broker's
actions constitute fraud, malice, or oppression, punitive damages
have been awarded.35 Punitive damages have also been extended to
other agent-principal situations.3 As in the broker cases, these cases
all involve parties who are not dealing at arm's length.
Punitive Damages in Insurance Contract Actions Before Egan
Insurance companies may commit three types of breaches of their
insurance contracts. The first is refusal to defend a suit against the
insured. This refusal is sometimes due to an erroneous belief that the
claim is not covered by the insurance policy. However, if the claim is
within the policy's coverage, the insurance company has breached its
contract.
The second type of breach is refusal or delay in paying the in-
sured's claim. In this situation the injured insured makes a claim
under the policy. Rather than pay the full amount immediately, the
insurer refuses to pay, delays payment, or offers the insured less than
he or she is entitled to under the policy. The insurer may have some
legitimate doubt about the validity or extent of the claim. It may
wish to investigate. Meanwhile the insured must wait at a time when
he or she may need the money the most. However, it may be against
the insurer's interests to pay now and investigate later.37 If the insur-
er knows of a potential defense to a claim, and yet pays it, it may be
precluded from later arguing "mistake of fact" to recover the
contract and is limited to the amount of the debt. The reason for the exception
for banks is that failure to honor a depositor's check can have the same effect on
an individual's stature in the community as certain slanders or libels.
33. Annot., 126 A.L.R. 206, 227 (1940).
34. Haigler'v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941); Bate v. Marsteller,
232 Cal. App. 2d 605, 43 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1965).
35. Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941). The reason for
awarding punitive damages is partially because a broker is a fiduciary and
holds a position of trust and confidence.
36. Alton v. Rogers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 667, 274 P.2d 487 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 982 (1955) (attorney mishandling client's funds); Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 225, 194 P.2d 533 (1948) (illiterate gave friend power of attorney to
dispose of property, and the friend kept the money); Holland v. Moreton, 10
Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960) (mishandled sale of mining claims).
37. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973) (dissenting opinion).
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money.3 8 Also, if the insured changes position as a result of the
payment, the insurer will not be entitled to restitution.39 As a result,
the insurer usually withholds payment. As in the refusal to defend
cases, if the claim is valid, the insurer has breached the contract.
The third type of breach is the failure to accept a settlement offer
from a third party when the offer is within the policy limits. In the
typical situation, the insured has taken out a liability policy with a
maximum liability. When the insured injures a third party, that
person may offer to settle. If the settlement offer is for less than the
policy limits, the insured may favor the settlement. He or she took out
the insurance policy as protection against liability, and a settlement
will cost him or her nothing. If the settlement offer exceeds or is near
the policy limits, the insurer has no interest in settling. Its maximum
liability is fixed by the policy. Therefore, if there is any chance of a
judgment for less than the settlement offer, the insurer will litigate. If
a judgment is returned for more than the policy limit the insurer will
only pay the policy amount plus its costs of litigating. The insurer has
also had the use of the money for the time it took the claimant to
litigate. Thus, the insurer has lost nothing. On the other hand, the
insured has no limit to his or her potential liability; he or she must
pay the difference between the judgment and the policy limit. Thus,
if the third party obtains a judgment in excess of the policy, the
insured may have an action against its insurer.
The measure of damages for these three types of breaches has
undergone extensive transformation in recent years. First, in 1914, in
Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co.,40 an insurance company was held
liable for the costs its insured incurred when the insurer'declined to
defend. It was soon established that when the insurer fails to defend
its insured, it is liable for resulting damages,41 even when the insurer
honestly believes that the claim is fraudulent or false; so long as the
claim alleges facts which if true would subject the insurer to liability,
the insurer must defend. However, the insurer's liability is limited to
the policy limits, plus the insured's expenses (attorney and court
costs). 42 The rationale is that the insurer's failure to defend did not
38. Meeme Mut. Home Protection Fire Ins. Co. v. Lorfeld, 194 Wis. 322, 216
N.W. 507 (1927).
39. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 69(1) (1937).
40. 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
41. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 66 Ga. App. 826, 19
S.E.2d 377 (1942); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694, 711 (1956).
42. Continental Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 528 P.2d 430
(Alaska 1974); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694, 717-37 (1956).
subject the insured to any loss other than the expenses incurred in
defense.
43
In 1924 the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Douglas v. United
States Fidelity & Guarantee Co.,4" held that an insurer has an im-
plied duty of good faith and fair dealing in disposing of third party
claims.45 The insurer's failure to exercise reasonable care to protect
the insured's rights can subject the insurer to liability for negligence.
Wisconsin accepted the negligence theory in 1930 in Hilker v. West-
ern Automobile Insurance Co.,46 where the insurer failed to interview
eyewitnesses to an accident. The insurer then negligently failed to
accept a reasonable settlement offer and a judgment was entered in
excess of the policy. The insurer was held liable for the excess.
In California, two separate developments have evolved in the area
of insured's rights against its insurer. First was the emergence of tort
theories of liability, and second was the increased availability of
punitive damages.
California, in its development of tort liability, first rejected the
negligence theory of recovery which Wisconsin had accepted in Hil-
ker. Instead, California substituted an implied breach of contract
cause of action.47 Negligence alone was insufficient to support a
judgment in excess of the policy limits; there must also have been bad
faith. Then, in 1967, in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,48 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the insured can sue in either tort or
contract for its insurer's failure to settle a third party claim within
policy limits. Crisci also set forth the standard of care for defendant
insurers in negotiating with third parties: the prudent insurer with-
out policy limits.4 9 Crisci outlined the policy behind this decision:
"[A]n insurer should not be permitted to further its own interests by
rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits unless it is
also willing to absorb losses which may result from its failure to
settle. 
50
In 1970, in Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,51
applying Crisci, a California court held that a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is implied in every insurance contract. This covenant
43. Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Minn. 482, 184 N.W. 189
(1921).
44. 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
45. Id. at 373-74, 127 A. at 710-11.
46. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
47. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958);
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
48. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
49. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
50. Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
51. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
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imposes a duty on the insurer not to do anything to deprive its
insured of the benefits of the policy. A breach of that duty is a tort,
although it may also constitute a breach of contract.52
Fletcher was upheld in 1973 in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.
53
The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was found to be
independent of any contractual obligations. This duty creates other
duties for the insurer. The first of these is to accept reasonable
settlement offers, and the second is to not unreasonably withhold
payments due an insured under a policy. Failure to pay reasonably
subjects the insurer to tort liability.
Finally, in Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co.,54 the California
Supreme Court found a breach of the insurer's implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing without finding that the breach was mali-
cious.5 5 This development of tort liability often allows an insured to
maintain a cause of action against his or her insurer when contract
law alone provides no remedy.
The availability of punitive damages developed at the same time as
did the tort theory of recovery. Previously, punitive damages were
only available for a cause of action for fraud but not for breach of
contract alone. 6 Later, punitive damages were allowed when the
insurer knowingly and falsely misrepresented the terms of a disabili-
ty policy, even though actual damages were nominal.17 The Fletcher
decision upheld the traditional view forbidding punitive damages for
breach of any contract no matter how willful or fraudulent. But the
court did allow punitive damages if there was tortious conduct plus
fraud or oppression, even though the conduct also constituted a
breach of contract. The court held that a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is a tort that would allow "in a proper
case punitive damages."5 8 In Silberg, the court reaffirmed that a
52. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
53. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
54. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
55. Id. at 460-62, 521 P.2d at 1108-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
56. Sharp v. Automobile Club of S. Cal., 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 653, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 588-89 (1964).
57. Weatherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1968).
58. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94. The court reasoned that an
insured is entitled to at least as much protection from its insurer as it is from a
stranger. The court noted that a party to a contract can recover damages caused
by a third party's interference with his rights under the contract. In a proper
situation the contracting party could recover punitive damages from the third
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is, in and of
itself, not sufficient to justify punitive damages. 9 To warrant an
award of punitive damages, there must be an intent to injure. Finally,
the Fetcher rule of no punitive damages without a finding of fraud
was modified by Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. In Egan the
court of appeal held that fraud in the ordinary sense of the word is
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages and that legal
fraud need not be shown.
6 0
Both of these developments-the emergence of tort theories of
liability and the increasing availability of punitive damages-indi-
cate the courts' overriding concern for the insured and a desire to
make recovery easier and to increase the measure of recovery.
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF EGAN
The Egan Decision
The facts of Egan involve the mishandling of an insured's claim.
Egan purchased a $200 per month disability policy from Mutual of
Omaha in 1962. The policy provided for life benefits in the event of
Egan's total disability as a result of an accidental injury or a sickness
confining him to home. Benefits were limited to three months' pay-
ment in the event of a "nonconfining" sickness.
On May 11, 1970, Egan fell off a roof, injuring his back. He filed a
claim under his policy and received $600 in September, 1970. A
month later, Mutual's claims manager accused Egan of fraud and
laughed at Egan's request for further payments. In February, 1971,
Mutual sent Egan a "final" payment of $626.66. In May, Egan was
reclassified as "sick" by Mutual. Mutual then attempted to buy the
policy from Egan, but he refused to surrender the policy. Later, a
$700 check was given to Egan, but he did not cash it.
During this time, Egan was unable to work and his family suffered
severe financial stress. Egan's physical condition was not thoroughly
investigated by Mutual. Prior to suit, Egan learned that he would
never be able to work again. He again attempted to settle with
Mutual but no agreement was reached.
At the trial the court found Mutual liable in tort for a bad faith
denial of the insurance benefits. The jury awarded $45,600 compen-
satory damages, $78,000 for emotional distress, and $5,000,000 puni-
party. Therefore, there is no reason to allow an insurer to do what a stranger
cannot.
59. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974).
60. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 678, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
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tive damages. The appellate court found that benefits were clearly
due under the policy and that even a good faith failure to pay can
give rise to tort liability.61 The court held that there need not be legal
fraud to support an award of punitive damages. 62 Gaining advantage
by means of dishonest acts, bad faith, or overreaching6 3 will support
an award of punitive damages. 64 The court found, however, that the
amount of punitive damages bore no reasonable relation to the com-
pensatory damages and reduced the award to $2,500,000.65 Finally,
the court ruled that compensatory damages are to be computed under
the tort rather than the contract standard66 and allowed an award of
compensatory damages for future loss. Egan is thus significant in at
least two respects: the size of the award affirmed and the award of
punitive damages where there is no legal fraud.
In considering the conduct of the defendant, the court of appeal
changed the rule outlined in Fletcher. Under Egan, the plaintiff is no
longer required to prove legal fraud to recover punitive damages. The
plaintiff need only show fraud in the common usage sense of dishon-
esty, bad faith, or overreaching. This holding is consistent with the
trend of California law to increase the availability of punitive dam-
ages in the area of insurer's breach of contract.
Regarding the size of the award, punitive damages must bear some
reasonable relation to the defendant's wealth and the compensatory
damages awarded. 67 Because the assets of the defendant will vary
from case to case, the same conduct will support different awards of
punitive damages. In addition, there is no theoretical limit to the
award which could be justified. Although this limitless ceiling may
appear appalling, it is consistent with the purposes of punitive dam-
ages. For an award to deter, it must be painful. Because the defend-
ant's conduct determines how painful the punishment should be, and
because his or her wealth is a function of how much money is neces-
61. Id. at 677, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
62. Id. at 678, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
63. Id.
64. It was necessary for the court to find some sort of fraud in view of the
requirements of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970):
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.
65. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 692, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
66. Id. at 685, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
67. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 210 (1973).
sary to inflict that punishment, there is no practical way to develop a
formula to compute punitive damages.
The Arguments Favoring Egan
The policy justifying the Egan award of punitive damages is in
many ways the same policy which justifies the use of punitive dam-
ages in any action. But, due to the peculiar nature of insurance
contracts, there are other factors which must be considered.
Fiduciary Relationship
The first argument favoring large awards of punitive damages
centers on the conflict of interest inherent in insurance contracts.
This conflict becomes apparent when a claim is filed; and it exists
whether the claim is made by the insured or a third party. The
insurance company considers its own interests. Failure to protect the
stockholders' investment could expose the executives to claims of
mismanagement. However, due to the fiduciary nature of the insur-
ance relationship, the insurer cannot ignore the insured's interests.
Indeed, the interests of the insured should be paramount. The insured
has contracted for payments by the insurer. In addition to whatever
contract duties the insurer has assumed, the law imposes the implied
duty of good faith and fair business dealing. 68 Thus, the insurer has a
duty to promptly pay legitimate claims by the insured and not to
jeopardize its insured's position in negotiations with third parties.
In this context, punitive damages serve two functions. First, they
discourage the insurer from engaging in misconduct. Second, as a
possible bounty, they encourage the insured to seek complete recov-
ery from his or her insurer when it tries to force the insured to settle
for less than he or she is entitled.
In Egan, the court found that Mutual's claims adjustor was "more
interested in Egan's then existing financial condition than in Egan's
medical condition. '69 But it was Egan's medical condition which was
determinative of his rights under the policy. Therefore, by failing to
properly investigate, Mutual had ignored the only true indication of
the extent of its obligations. This failure was a breach of Mutual's
fiduciary duty to Egan.
Adhesive Nature of Insurance Contracts
The second major argument favoring punitive damages is the adhe-
sive nature of insurance contracts. As mass production and large
68. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,510 P.2d 1032,108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P,2d 198 (1958);
Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
69. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 675, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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scale businesses developed in the United States, so did the use of
standardized contracts."° The transportation, banking, and insurance
industries led the way with standardized contracts."1 Typically,
standardized contracts are used by a party in a strong bargaining
position. The weaker party needs the goods or services and is unable
to bargain for better terms; the stronger party either has a monopoly
or is using an industry-wide contract.
Courts have attempted to protect the weaker party without upset-
ting "the elementary rules" of contract law.7 2 While acknowledging
the rule that courts can interpret contracts but not make them, the
courts have strained to find interpretation issues. Insurance cases
have shown the courts' skill at interpreting "ambiguous" clauses to
protect the policyholder when in fact there was no ambiguity.
7 3
Courts have also tried to protect the weaker party in cases where
an insurance company unreasonably delays action on an application
for insurance and a loss results. The law of contracts will not support
recovery for the applicant.74 The application is merely an offer, and
until it is accepted no contractual duties arise. Yet the applicant can
recover in many states.
75
The applicant often recovers on a negligence theory.76 The law
imposes on the insurer a duty to act without undue delay on applica-
tions. Professor Kessler states that "the courts pay mere lip service to
the dogma that the common law of contracts governs insurance
contracts. With the help of the law of torts they nullify those parts of
the law of contracts which in the public interest are regarded as
inapplicable.
'77
Professor Kessler then asks: "[Clan the unity of the law of con-
tracts be maintained in the face of the increasing use of contracts of
adhesion?"78 As evidenced by the development of tort liability in the
insurance cases, the answer appears to be "no." When the insurer's
70. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLuM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 633.
73. Id. at 632.
74. Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 487, 493 (1953).
75. Id. at 510. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 70, at 635.
76. Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 487, 510 (1953).
77. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 70, at 635.
78. Id. at 636.
actions cause the insured injuries for which contract law offers no
redress, the courts have invoked tort standards to permit recovery. At
first, this was merely a duty to act on the application without undue
delay.79 Later, courts found a duty to defend.80 Then, the courts
permitted recovery when the insurer unreasonably refused to settle a
third party claim.8' Finally, the court allowed recovery for delay in
the handling of a claim by its own insured.
82
The expanding measure of damages further demonstrates the dis-
favor with which courts regard adhesion contracts. For a delay in
acting on an application, the measure of damages could not exceed
the amount of insurance for which the plaintiff applied.8 3 For a
failure to defend, damages were expanded to the policy limits plus
expenses and attorney fees. 84 For failure to settle a third party claim,
or delay or refusal to pay a claim by its insured, the measure of
damages included recovery for mental distress and punitive dam-
ages.85 In each of these steps, tort principles were applied to contract
actions. This development was necessary, however, if any remedies
were to be available to the policy holder. The insured is unable to
protect himself or herself. Punitive damages and other tort principles
help to balance the inequities caused by the adhesive nature of
insurance contracts.
It should be noted that when courts find an adhesive contract in
other areas of the law, the typical judicial action is to disregard
clauses in the contract, 86 or sometimes void the entire contract.
8 7
However, in insurance contracts neither remedy would be appropri-
ate. Courts have thus adopted tort principles and permit the insured
79. Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 487 (1953). See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, note
70 supra.
80. Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
81. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958);
Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
82. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,510 P.2d 1032,108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899
(1976); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
83. Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P.2d 73 (1934); Annot., 32
A.L.R.2d 487, 536 (1953).
84. Continental Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 528 P.2d 430
(Alaska 1974); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694 (1956).
85. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899
(1976); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
86. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 70, at 635.
87. Tunld v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
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to recover non-contractual damages. And recently the courts have
allowed less traditional measures of recovery: mental distress, puni-
tive damages, and, in Egan, compensatory damages for future loss.
Deterrence
Finally, large punitive damages are necessary in insurance con-
tract cases to serve the goal of deterrence. The rationale is that if an
individual or corporation is punished severely enough, it will alter its
conduct to avoid future punishment. In the case of a corporation, the
stockholders will not tolerate executives who subject the corporation
to large punitive damages. Therefore, the executives will either act to
avoid punitive damages and protect their jobs, or be replaced by
someone who will.88 The award of $2,500,000 against Mutual will
discourage continued misconduct by Mutual. It will also serve to
warn other insurers to deal fairly with their insureds.
This rationale reinforces arguments based on the adhesive nature
of insurance contracts and the fiduciary relationship between the
insurer and the insured. Sufficiently large punitive damage awards
may be a more effective tool to combat the use of adhesive contracts
than is disregarding the adhesive clauses in the contract. Punitive
damages may also discourage abuses of a fiduciary relationship,
especially when the insurer's liability is otherwise limited.
The Arguments Opposing Egan
There are numerous objections to punitive damages. Those dis-
cussed first are applicable to punitive damages for any action. Those
objections discussed later are peculiar to insurance contracts.
Objections to Punitive Damages in General
The first general objection is that punishment is not a proper
function of civil law.8 9 It is the purpose of criminal law to punish
88. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 909 (1939), says:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,. . . (c) the agent
was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment, or (d) the employer or a manager of the employer ratified
or approved the act.
Comment a referring to (c) and (d) says that "where a person acting in a
managerial capacity either does an outrageous act or approves of such an act by
a subordinate, the imposition of punitive damages upon the employer serves as
a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for important positions."
89. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 408, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501, 223 N.Y.S.2d
anyone who commits a public wrong. The plaintiff has been com-
pared to a prosecuting attorney paid by the number of convictions he
or she obtains." The obvious fear is that anyone in that position
becomes more interested in obtaining a conviction than in punishing
the guilty.
Another objection rests on the procedural differences between a
civil and a criminal trial. Many of the safeguards afforded a criminal
defendant are absent in a civil suit. A civil defendant is tried without
indictment or information, denied the opportunity to face accusers
when depositions are introduced at trial, and denied the opportunity
for executive clemency. In addition, a civil defendant can lose at trial
by a preponderance of the evidence although the criminal prosecu-
tion must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.9 1 Also, the civil
jury has great discretion as to the amount of damages. In a criminal
suit the maximum punishment is limited by statute.
However, these two objections prove too much; they apply as much
to the admonitory function of compensatory damages as they do to
punitive damages. If these arguments are ignored with respect to
compensatory damages, they should be rejected with respect to puni-
tive damages. "2 An additional rebuttal to these objections is that
there is a difference between a criminal fine and a civil judgment.
Because a slighter stigma is attached to losing a civil suit than to a
criminal conviction, and because there is no chance of imprisonment
in a civil suit, the safeguards normally available to criminal defend-
ants are unnecessary. The safeguards protect the accused's interest in
personal liberty. In Egan, Mutual was never threatened with crimin-
al fines, and none of Mutual's employees was threatened with impris-
onment.
Another objection is that punitive damages are a windfall to the
plaintiff.93 The plaintiff has been repaid for his or her loss through
compensatory damages. Awards for pain, suffering, humiliation, in-
dignity, and loss of reputation adequately compensate the plaintiff.
Any additional recovery is a windfall. Therefore, punitive damages
488, 493 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1941).
90. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1178
(1931).
91. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Willis, Measure of Damages
When Property is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HARV. L. REV.
419, 421 (1909).
92. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1183
(1931).
93. Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261,9 N.W. 88 (1881); Spokane Truck & Dray
Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 52-54, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (1891); Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W.
Va. 220, 242-43, 6 S.E. 485,497 (1888); Willis, Measure of Damages When Property
is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HARv. L. REv. 419, 421 (1909).
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might better be paid to the state. Under such a plan, the jury might be
more objective toward the defendant, and there is less risk that the
jury will be swayed by sympathy for the plaintiff.9 4 However, the
compensation and revenge functions of punitive damages justify the
award of punitive damages to the plaintiff rather than the state.9
Also, if the money were paid to the state, the plaintiff would have less
incentive to bring an action when his or her actual damages are
small; thus, the bounty function of punitive damages would be de-
feated.
A final general objection is that there is little control over excess
judgments. If the court ignores the punitive aspect of compensatory
damages, large punitive awards become even more excessive.9 6 To
curb excess damages, courts often insist that punitive damages bear
some relationship to actual damages. However, there has never been
any agreement as to a proper ratio, and this lack of consistency has
led to some questionable results. This fact is illustrated when a
grossly negligent defendant fortuitously causes only minor damage
and when a barely negligent defendant through a series of unfortu-
nate coincidences causes mass destruction.97 Clearly, it is desirable to
punish the former to a greater degree than the latter. Yet, a ratio test
would support a greater award of punitive damages in the second
case.
However, denying punitive damages altogether would seem too
extreme a response to this argument. If inequities exist in the ratio
test, the better solution is to relate punitive damages to the probable
result of the defendant's conduct-as opposed to the actual result-
than to deny punitive damages altogether.
94. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 525
(1957).
95. Id.
96. In West Virginia, the jury is instructed regarding the punitive effect of
compensatory damages:
If, after the jury has assessed damages to fully compensate the plaintiff
for the injury, such damages are still not sufficientin amount to punish
the defendant ... and ... to prevent the repetition of the same or the
commission of similar wrongs, they may add such further sum, in their
judgment, as may be necessary for this purpose. But if the damages
assessed as compensatory are sufficient in amount to operate at the
same time as a punishment and a warning, the jury are not authorized to
add still a further and greater sum, and thus subject the defendant to a
double punishment in the same case for the same wrong.
Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246,260, 22 S.E. 58,63 (1895). A similar instruction was
approved in Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94 S.E. 968 (1918).
97. This example is set forth at Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (1931).
As a result of these general criticisms some jurisdictions refuse to
award punitive damages. 8 In the jurisdictions which do allow puni-
tive damages, they are often frowned upon.99 And many jurisdictions
which do award punitive damages, do so only under limited condi-
tions.100
Objections to Punitive Damages in Insurance Contracts
The Hadley v. Baxendale Precedent
The first objection is the Hadley v. Baxendale precedent. The law
is concerned with precedent because of the necessity of certainty.1 1
"Obviously a man needs certainty in the law to protect his property
rights and his contract rights against a practice of changing the rules
in the middle of the game."'12 A party to a contract is entitled to rely
on the rules of law which existed when he created and performed the
contract. Thus, the adoption of a rule which would allow punitive
damages for contracts might be better left to legislatures. But in
insurance contracts, the acts of the insurer also border on tort. For an
insurer to claim that it acted in reliance on some rules of law would
be to admit wanton conduct or premeditation.
In addition, modem courts are less reluctant to tamper with prece-
dent than they were at earlier times. This willingness may be due to
the recognition that the realities of life demand that we follow sound
rules and laws; and when we discover that a principle by which we
have lived is erroneous we must change it to conform with the new
norm. For these reasons, the Hadley precedent may be the weakest
argument for denying punitive damages.
Passion and Prejudice when an Insurance Company
is Involved
A second objection concerns the possibility that passion and preju-
dice have clouded juries' decisions. It is generally accepted that juries
are more hostile toward insurance companies than toward individu-
als. 10 3 For this reason, the fact that a defendant has liability insur-
98. E.g., Ganapolsky v. Park Sanders, 439 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1971) (applying
Puerto Rico law); Conrad v. Lakewood Gen. Hosp., 67 Wash. 2d 934,410 P.2d 785
(1966).
99. E.g., Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952).
100. E.g., City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257,
47 N.E.2d 265 (1943) (no punitive damages unless authorized by statute).
101. Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284, (1954).
102. Hare & Hare, Stare Decisis, 31 ALA. LAW. 273, 276 (1970).
103. Star Furniture Co. v. Holland, 273 Ky. 617,624,117 S.W.2d 603,607 (1938),
stated: "we, as well as all courts, have held that the average juror is either
unconsciously or otherwise influenced by the fact that the alleged negligent
actor carries insurance." Holman v. Cole, 242 Mich. 402, 404, 218 N.W. 795, 796
(1928) noted: "It is a fact of which we cannot but take judicial notice, that, in
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ance is generally kept from juries. 10 4 There are situations in which
the fact that a defendant is insured is admissible, such as when it is
relevant to ownership, agency or control, or to a witness' credibili-
ty. 05 But normally the jury does not learn of the insurer's existence.
Yet, in direct suits against insurers, such as in Egan, it obviously is
impossible to keep the insurer's identity a secret. Therefore, the
potential for excessive verdicts returned out of passion and prejudice
is greatly enhanced.
However, this objection loses its impact in view of the recent
relaxation of the rule of secrecy.106 Although courts may still believe
that juries are swayed by the knowledge of a defendant's insurance,
an insurer may sometimes be named as a party defendant and held
liable for punitive damages even when it has done nothing of a
culpable nature. 07 Therefore, the objection that an insured should
not be subjected to punitive damages where it is guilty of improper
conduct is unpersuasive.
No Alternative Conduct when the Insurer Doubts
the Claim's Validity
A third objection is that punitive damages force an insurer to pay
its insured's claim even though the insurer may have some doubt
about the validity of the claim. Thus, the argument runs, the insurer
has no reasonable alternative. Silberg suggested that when there is
cases where jurors obtain information that the damages as fixed by them will be
paid by insurance companies, that the amount thereof is usually greatly en-
hanced."
104. C. McCoRmvcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201, at 479 (1972).
105. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 767 (1949).
106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1959) provides: "The injured person
... at [his or her] option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer
within the terms and limits of the policy .... This right of direct action shall
exist. whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct
action .... " Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.04 (West 1977) provides: "In any action for
damages caused by negligence, any insurer which has an interest in the outcome
of such controversy ... is by this section made a proper party defendant in any
action brought by plaintiff in this state on account of any claim against the
insured."
Texas, by judicial decision, permits the insurer to be joined when the policy is
a liability policy and, therefore, for the benefit of the injured party. This proce-
dure is permitted on the joinder theory of two transactionally related causes of
action. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 766-67 (1949).
107. C. McCoRmlcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201, at 482 (1972),
suggests that because the parties and the court are entitled to know the identity
of all parties to a suit, the jury, as part of the tribunal, has a right to know of the
presence of an insurer who is a party in all but name only.
an alternate insurer who may be responsible for paying the claim, the
first insurer should pay and put a lien on future payments by the
second insurer. 0 8 This approach seems reasonable when there are
competing insurers, each denying liability and each willing to wait
until the matter can be litigated. However, it offers no solace to the
insurer who doubts the legitimacy of a claim when no alternate
insurer exists. If it turns out that the first insurer is not responsible
for the payment the insurer cannot count on a second insurer for
restitution. Instead, the insurer must turn to his insured for restitu-
tion. And there are three obstacles to restitution.
The first problem is that if the insurer knew of a possible defense
but paid, the insurer may have waived any claim of "mistake of
fact."1
0 9
The second obstacle would be a reasonable change of position by
the insured in reliance on the payments. If the insured makes such a
change of position, the insurer cannot obtain restitution. 1 0 There
exists no effective way to protect the insurer. If the insurer was to
inform the insured that there may be a subsequent attempt to recover
the payment and that therefore the insured should not spend the
payment, it would undermine the purpose of paying now and inves-
tigating later. This purpose is, of course, to give the insured the
benefit of the policy when he or she needs it the most.
The final difficulty is the financial condition of the insured. Even if
the insured's reliance on the payments was unreasonable or the
insurer has reserved its rights to the payments, the insurer will still
not recover the payment if the insured is judgment proof.
These obstacles force the insurer to make a choice: The insurer
must either pay a claim which it believes invalid and attempt to
recover years later the monies paid or deny the payment and risk an
astronomical award of punitive damages. This may indeed put the
insurer in a difficult position. Nevertheless, the potential for abuse
by insurers due to the fiduciary and adhesive natures of insurance
contracts more than offsets this objection. The insurer has assumed
contractual duties and it is usually well paid for the risks it takes.
The insurer should absorb the losses which result from its failure to
settle a claim,"' including punitive damages.
108. 11 Cal. 3d at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
109. Meeme Mut. Home Protection Fire Ins. Co. v. Lorfeld, 194 Wis. 322, 216
N.W. 507 (1927).
110. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 69(1) (1937).
111. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
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Higher Premiums
The final objection is economic. If insurers must pay huge awards
of punitive damages, the public eventually bears the cost through
higher premiums. The counter argument is that insurers who are
forced to raise their premiums will be forced out of business and, as a
result, insurance costs will not increase. This may, however, ignore
the economic realities of the insurance industry. The claim is that the
insurance market functions more as an oligopoly than as a free
market, and, therefore, most insurers will not be driven out of busi-
ness. Rather, costs will rise and the public will bear the cost.
This argument may have the most merit of all. If in fact higher
premiums will result from large awards of punitive damages, then
the public-rather than the insurer-bears the cost. Thus, if the
insurer is able to maintain its profit margin by passing the cost of
punitive damages along to other insureds, the punishment and deter-
rence functions of punitive damages may be defeated. However, even
if the economic nature of the insurance industry is such that insurers
will charge similar rates regardless of costs, punitive damages may
still serve some function. Those insurers which do not have to pay
large awards of punitive damages will have larger profit margins.
This will encourage insurers to minimize punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
Punitive damages can be an effective means of combating breach
of contracts by insurers. Although several objections to punitive
damages have been expressed, only two objections have real merit:
(1) there are no reasonable alternatives to withholding payments
when an insurer has reasonable doubts as to the validity of a claim,
and (2) the public will ultimately bear the cost of punitive damages
through higher premiums.
These objections, however, must be weighed against the value of
encouraging insurers to make good faith efforts to settle claims.
Arguably, the insurer will take its own interests into account
whenever it has genuine doubts as to the validity of a claim, regard-
less of the punitive damages that may be imposed. Therefore, the real
value of punitive damages is to encourage insurers to settle fairly
with their insureds in the absence of genuine doubt.
As to the argument that the public will pay the costs of large
judgments, the impact on the insurance industry of cases awarding
punitive damages must be considered. If the availability of punitive
damages has the predicted deterrent effect, there should be fewer
punitive damage awards in the future and thus premiums may not
rise. Furthermore, these objections to punitive damages carry little
weight against the numerous justifications for their imposition, not-
ably their deterrent effect and their. potential for combatting the
abuses of adhesive contracts and fiduciary relationships.
The recent response of the California courts to bad faith cases such
as Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. has demonstrated that
punitive damages are justified from a theoretical point of view. The
responses of the insurance industry, not yet available, will determine
the future value of punitive damages as a practical matter.
BRADLEY JAY FISHER
